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Look! It’s moving! Is it alive?
How movement affects humans’ affinity
to living and non-living entities.
Oliver Olsen Wolf and Geraint A. Wiggins
Abstract—This article is about the relation between human observers and various human and non-human entities. Our focus is on
humans’ perception of movement. In particular how it affects the relationship to entities. We explore the way the movement of natural
entities, locomoting animals and robots or the expressivity of dancers, play a vital part in our perception of these things. Humans’ intuitive
process of categorizing and attributing characteristics as a dialog and understanding of things, as found in the concept of metaphor, is
central to our method.
Drawing from the linguistic concept of animacy, expressing how sentient or alive an entity is interpreted we propose a metric of
quantitative measures to investigate whether conceptual boundaries of entities, like those between human and non-human, change when
movement comes into play. By means of measuring subjective responses, the rating of features in relation to specific types of entities like
humans, animals and machines, we develop and validate a measurement tool in two online surveys. In the first (k = 93), we determine
particular regions for each type, and in the second (k = 72), we investigate whether these regions change when entities move. We
present the methodology and empirical work. Our key findings are alongside the metric, an agency-framework informed by related work to
locate shifts in participants’ interpretation as degrees of animacy and agency ranging from intentional action to causal movement. We
provide results demonstrating the effect of participants’ interpretation of entities under two conditions, represented either static or
dynamic, we can show that movement affects participants’ interpretation. For example the shift of a human represented with mechanical
movement, by virtue of breakdancing moves, towards the region designated to machines.
Index Terms—Animacy, Expressiveness, Language, Metaphors, Motion Perception, Nonverbal Communication, Quantitative Methods.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
THE primary motivation for the work presented herecomes from observations made during an exhibition
featuring an artwork created by the first author. In the
exhibition, an everyday object – a technologically modified
hairbrush placed on a plinth – suddenly metamorphosed
into a crawling animal-like robotic creature1. Observers’
reactions to the hairbrush’s movement ranged from refusing
to favouring the object. Audience members reacted with
cries of astonishment and comments like “creepy,” “eerie,”
“almost like an animal,” or “it is trying to commit suicide?”
when the brush crawled towards the edge of its plinth.
Furthermore, the work lead into discussion with visitors
about their relations with objects and machines and elicited
personal stories. One of the visitors revealed being an owner
of a RoombaTM vacuum cleaner robot. She explained that
she quite enjoys watching the robot not only because its is
doing the job, but also because the “robot seems so lively, as
it is doing something or other all the time.”
The aim of this work is to understand how the obser-
vation of movement motivates changes in peoples’ affinity
towards an entity. To approach this we employ a linguistic
strategy using language to indicate expressions of attitudes or
• O. O. Wolf and G. A. Wiggins are members of the Computational Creativity
Lab at the School of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science, Queen
Mary University of London. E-mail: o.o.wolf@qmul.ac.uk
1. See Uruca Caliandrum documentation: http://hasa-labs.org/orbit
en/uruca caliandrum.php
emotions as found in the responses to the crawling hairbrush
or the Roomba robots’ cleaning boogie. Emanating from
humans attraction to the dynamic form of things (expressiv-
ity), the attribution of characteristics to entities (metaphors),
derived from our dialogical nature and motivated by our
ability to enter into relationships with our surroundings
and make meaning is considered as a crucial concept in
understanding how people relate to entities.
In the context section, we look at this relationship through
various concepts and examples from literature and animation
to show how language indicates differences in our affective
relationship along the lines of interpreting an entity as
animate or inanimate (animacy). Furthermore, we present
movement (agency) as one of the primary elements in
founding that relationship and conceptual ambiguities as
a stylistic device to affect the relationship.
We then survey related work, mainly from cognitive psy-
chology, with a focus on anthropomorphism and primarily
using traits or descriptions to determine observers attribution
of characteristics to human and non-human agents. These are
then complemented with considerations of different forms
of movement and how they affect people’s affinity and
interpretation, stemming from developmental psychology,
computer graphic animation and human-robot interaction
(HRI). The findings are transferred into an agency-framework
to highlight observed movements, structures and kinematics
as potentially being interpreted as animate or inanimate.
The resulting agency-framework developed here affords
a conceptual structure that may be used to evaluate the
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varieties of interpretations investigated in two empirical
studies. The method established and informed by the studies
provides a computational approach to assess interpretative
relationships of subjects to various images of entities as
an attribution of qualities or features, developed in Study
A. The features are used to built ontological categories
representative for humans, animals, and machines. The result
is a feature-space with three designated regions acting as a
measurement tool. Study B subsequently provides measures
for the effect of movement as the displacement of participants’
response to static or dynamic representation of entities
therein. Computing the subjective responses we can represent
processed information using geometrical structure to indicate
shifts in participants’ interpretation in form of distances
between the different interpretations of the entities in relation
to the categories. These results are represented graphically by
Principal Component Analysis and numerically by a triple
of typicality-displacement in relation to the three regions.
The metric established in the methodology and informed
by Study A and B could also be used as a quantitative
method for analysing affects in subjective experiences of art
installations, performances, or sculptural artworks, as well
as in human-robot interaction.
2 CONTEXT
The aim of this section, which provides examples from
literature and animation and associated concepts, is twofold.
One goal is to present movement, emanating from humans’
attraction to the dynamic form of things, as one of the
primary factors that provokes affection, as well as a stylistic
device used by artists e.g. in cartoons, bringing a drawing
to life. The other goal is to demonstrate how linguistic
phenomena, in particular metaphor, can be devices to evoke,
express and indicate emotions, as, for example, found in
poetry. Conclusively this section provides the rational to use
the sociolinguistic device of the metaphor as an indicator for
changes in the affective relationship. In congruence to the
follow up methodology and studies, apparent in differences
of attributing features.
2.1 Expressiveness – primacy of movement
Langer characterizes expressiveness as the dynamic form that
is apparent in the eye of the beholder as changing intensity
of qualities through motion, like the funnel of water, a dance
or the momentary efflorescence of a bursting rocket. The
dynamic form disappears as soon as the motion stops or
slows beyond a certain degree [1, p.18]. For her, expressive
form is any perceptible or imaginable whole that exhibits a
relationship of parts, qualities or aspects within the whole.
All these inseparable elements of subjective reality compose
the “inward life” of human beings.
Our own movement and the expressive form of things are
intimately related [2]. We learn through our bodily interac-
tion with the world which forms a system of intimate beliefs
about the conception of animacy and artificiality of things
in the world [3]. Within this relationship, the expressiveness
of things is considered as an immediate experience. Carey
recognizes the “knowledge of spatiotemporal continuity and
cohesion” [4, p.96] as a core cognition that is not conceptual.
Likewise Ingold [5, p.68] acknowledges the primacy of
movement conceiving it ontological prior to the properties
projected onto things.
2.2 Metaphors – interpretative relationship
Langer [1, p.23] furthermore explains that if we want to name
something that is too new to have a name, like a gadget we
have not seen before or a newly discovered creature, or to
express a relationship for which we have no connective word,
we mention or describe it with something analogous.
Lakoff and Johnson [6] correspondingly determine that
human purposes typically require us to impose artificial
boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete. To
deal rationally with our experience we create ontological
metaphors, through our subjective responses and descrip-
tions, that go beyond purely behavioural or dispositional
inferences. For instance, the reactions to the hairbrush
exemplify affection and how people wittingly or unwittingly
assign capacities considered as distinctly animate to inani-
mate entities evoked by movement.
Interpreting non-human entities like the hairbrush as
intending to commit suicide embodies attributing human
form or a human mind to the entity. This is described in the
concept of anthropomorphism, characterised by the creation of
human-like agents out of nonhumans [7], as a special form
of metaphor. In this process, Epley [8] identifies three major
key determinants: Sociality, Effectance, and Elicited Knowledge.
At the core of their model is a process of induction of
elicited knowledge, using existing knowledge about ourself
or from conversing with others to guide inferences about
properties, characteristics and mental states of non-human
agents. Influenced by two motivational factors: sociality, the
need and desire to establish social connections with others
and effectance, the need to interact effectively.
Seibt [9] questions the relation and interaction with the
environment and objects as anthropomorphism. She brings
to question whether ‘anthropomorphism’ is the right label
for make-believe projections of this kind. Referring to Wal-
ton [10], she says that interpreting a natural thing or an
artefact as a companion does not necessarily imply treating
it as a human being. Instead she says that we generally
have a long-standing practice of projecting social roles onto
our surrounding as a way to socialize the world and not
to anthropomorphise it. Correspondingly Attfield [11] and
Turkle [12] foster an interpretative account of cultural objects
by emphasizing the importance of social history of everyday
life in our relation to objects and things.
However, in as far as anthropomorphism is an inductive
process or interpretations in the form of make-believe
projections, it resembles the concept of metaphors as “un-
derstanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms
of another” [6, p.5], as for instance demonstrated in the
attribution of the hairbrush’s alleged suicidal tendencies.
Moreover, humans’ capacity for conceptual representation
involves conceptual changes as an intuitive process [4,
p.3]. Within this process of interpretation, language has the
potential to capture ontological commitments [4, p.35]. This
is illustrated for instance in the following as divergence in
the attribution of animacy and agency.
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2.3 Animacy – animate-inanimate distinction
Animacy as a semantic principle and linguistic concept
provides indications of how sentient or alive the referent of a
word is interpreted. Its variation is a matter of gradient rather
than a simple animate and inanimate binary [13, p.27]. From
this perspective, differences in the use of words describing
an entity’s animacy indicate differences in its interpretation.
They can also be considered as a stylistic device to express
and evoke emotions or attitudes through language.
In this way it is of interest for example in poetic writing
to find smiling or dancing flowers, angry or cruel winds [14]
or jumping rainbows [15, p.53]. Ruskin, in opposition to
anthropomorphism, termed this pathetic fallacy [16]. Corre-
spondingly, writing “[t]he lamp was staring at him” [17, p.57]
could be considered as stylistic device playing with animacy
and the concomitant attribution of human emotions and
conduct to a lamp. For literature theory animacy is of interest
because manifest in language it indicates the characterization
of a referent ranging from human, animate to inanimate [18,
p.47]. For instance referring to the wind as “[h]e closed the
door”, “[t]he wind closed the door”, “[t]he door was closed
by the wind” [18, p.49]. Thus, in contrast to the previous
example of the lamp, describing it in a more factual language,
as “shining at him” embodies differences along the lines of
portraying an entity more as animate or inanimate.
This game with animacy, what Eisenstein [15] determines
the principle of poetry, is even more apparent when move-
ment comes into play as he writes in reference to Disney’s
animations.
2.4 Agency – movement and action
Agency is intimately related to animacy, and likewise both are
a matter of gradient [13, p.29]. In this sense, different degrees
of agency are apparent for instance in different movements
of a lamp. Consider the renowned Pixar desktop lamp Luxo
Jr.2 moving organically or mechanically, or as if moved by an
external agency, shed light on its animacy.
Along these lines Rakison and Poulin-Dubois [20] char-
acterizes the degree of an entity’s agency as likely to being
more the recipient or more the agent of an action. Gallagher
and Zahavi [21, p.44] describe this divergence from a
subjective/first person perspective: When I’m walking, I’m
not only the owner of the experience — the sense that it is
my body that is moving — I’ve also the sense of agency
as being the initiator, which is to say the author of the
action. In contrast, when being nudged by someone, the
experience lacks authorship, as the cause for the action
comes from outside. In equal measures, referring to grammar
and language, Jackendoff distinguishes between actor and
experiencer [22, cited by [23]3].
Thus variances in the interpretation of an entity’s move-
ment as being the recipient or agent of an action provides
evidence whether it is apparent as degrees of agency ranging
from involuntary movement to intentional action. Hence, for in-
stance an animated desktop lamp moving by itself has more
agency, characterized by author and ownership both seem
to reside within the entity, while when being involuntary
2. See [19, p.189] and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luxo Jr.
3. The original source of [22] was not available to the authors.
moved by someone its agency is becoming less, characterized
by the apparent divergence of authorship and ownership of
the action.
2.5 Affective relationships – the principle of poetry
It is commonly accepted that our relation to inanimate
objects is different than to biological entities. However
this relation comprises conceptual ambiguities. The affect
towards movement, the expressive form of entities, on the
one hand can be considered as part of our survival kit to
distinguish animate from inanimate [24, p.257], on the other,
hand in hand with the latter, as exemplified above, it is the
survival kit of poetry.
The principle of poetry lies in the potential to transfigure,
to transform, comprising an inversion of familiar relations
between animate and the world of things [15, p.30]. The
lively behaviour of a Roomba robot described above, or
a breakdancer moving in a mechanical way, could be
taken as examples representing a particular ontological
uncertainty [25]: the enactment of the animate vs. inanimate
contradiction found in a puppet-as-object or a puppet-as-
person [26].
Gaver et al. [27] underline ambiguity as a powerful
resource that can promote personal relationships fuelled
by curiosity and engagement. They differentiate ambiguity as
the attribution of our interpretation of objects, from fuzziness
or inconsistency, which are attributes of objects. “This inter-
pretative relationship is the source of ambiguity’s appeal: by
thwarting easy interpretation, ambiguous situations require
to participate in meaning making” [27, 235]. In this way
interpreting a stimulus, like the movement of a puppet
or a lamp, belonging to multiple ontological categories
(object/live) could be a source of repulsion and attraction.
Belonging simultaneously to multiple ontological categories
can elicit a state of discomfort because it is ambiguous
and conflicting [28]. Eisenstein in turn considers more the
attraction, as a secret of the “comic mechanism” [15, p.65], as
“the comical it to be found in the incompatibility of the one
with the other” [15, p.37].
Conclusively, changes in our affective relationship gen-
erally could be attributed to our “individual’s pursuit of
meaning” [29, cited by [30, p.359]]. Our “innate tendency to
focus on life and lifelike processes” [31, p.1] and our intuitive
process of categorizing and attributing characteristics as a
dialog and understanding of things, typically require us to
impose artificial boundaries that make physical phenomena
discrete. When interpreting the phenomenological experience
of an entity, like the ambiguous behaviour of a familiar
hairbrush or a lamp transforming into a biological subject, dif-
ferent metaphors come into play. These subjective responses
apparent in metaphorical descriptions can be operationalized
as expressing differences in the affective relationship towards
an entity. Shifts in this interpretative relationship represented
in the concepts of animacy and agency are central to our study.
3 RELATED WORK
In the previous section we highlighted metaphors as a
sociolinguistic and stylistic device to provoke and indicate
differences in terms of affect described in words as degrees
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TAFFC.2018.2820707, IEEE
Transactions on Affective Computing
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AFFECTIVE COMPUTING 4
of animacy and agency. Accordingly, in this section we
first look at studies examining participants’ relationships
to entities like humans, non-human animals and machines,
mainly in terms of anthropomorphism evaluating conceptual
changes based on feature attribution. Subsequently these
are put alongside a body of work looking at differences in
attributions as an effect of movement.
The aim is to amend the concepts of animacy and agency
with research in social perception e.g., animation, using
visual motion cues to probe observers’ ability to discriminate
animate from inanimate visual stimuli or HRI, using physical
interaction to elicit different interpretations in observers. As a
result these findings are composed into an animacy-framework
to be used as a conceptual structure to frame and evaluate
the consecutive empirical work.
3.1 Anthropomorphism – conceptual transitions
One of the motivations behind the design of our study was
an unpublished technical report by Kiesler and Goetz [32].
To evaluate inanimate and mechanistic elements of “mental
models”, they set up a study comparing participants’ re-
sponses to two versions of a questionnaire. By asking one
group of respondents to rate the human-like qualities of
attributes and another about machine-like qualities, they
obtained a list in which the difference between the responses
was assumed to reflect the manner in which traits where
perceived.
Similarly, Waytz et al. [33] provided non-
anthropomorphic (observable or functional features
like “useful”, “durable”) and anthropomorphic traits
(“seeing”, “feeling”) and asked people to rate them in
response to non-human agents, concluding that individual
differences in anthropomorphism exist and matter for creating
an empathic connection with non-human agents, for
judgements of responsibility and culpability, and for creating
social influence. Using equal measures, Epley et al. [7]
investigate differences in peoples’ interpretation of entities
like gadgets, gods and greyhounds. By having people rating
five “anthropomorphic mental-states,” e.g., the extent to
which the gadget has “a mind of its own,” “intentions,”
“free will,” “consciousness,” and “experiences emotions,”
they demonstrate that people tend to anthropomorphise
non-human agents such as animals and gadgets, but
also indicate tendencies of dehumanization, when people
characterize human agents as non-human.
How dimensions of human social cognition are applied to
non-human objects is demonstrated by Eyssel and Hegel [34].
Having people infer certain traits to different designs of a
robot, their results indicate that participants applied gender
stereotypes that typically characterize human-human social
cognitive processes to robots.
The denial of human attributes to other people and
likening them to non-humans (dehumanization) as a subtle
and everyday phenomena is supported by Loughnan and
Haslam’s work and findings [35]. By prompting people to do
go/no-go association tasks of traits they assess differences
among social categories of humans, ‘other humans’ and
non-humans. The result indicate effects of infrahumanization
and self-humanizing: people attribute fewer uniquely human
emotions to others (out-groups) than to members of their
group (in-group) and human-nature traits are attributed to
the self more than to the others. Concluding that in our
social perception dehumanizing and infrahumanizing is
fundamental.
That people’s intimacy to animals and objects similarly
effect the relationship is shown by Kiesler et al. [36]. In a
study comparing people’s explanation of behaviours of dogs,
fish or animated artefacts they provide evidence that being
an owner prompts stronger psychological explanation, e.g.,
higher degree of attribution intentionality to the animals’
behaviour and increasing emotional attachment.
3.2 Agency – measure effects of movement
As the concept of agency illustrated, an entity’s movement
characteristic affect the way thoughts and actions are directed
to entities. In this respect Gelman et al. [37] recognize that
the fundamental difference between whether events are
identified along the lines of social and nonsocial is that
the former involve animate objects, like people or animals,
while the latter is referring to nonliving things.
Early exploration of conceptions and meaning attributed
to the stimuli of movement originate from [38], [39], [40].
These works experimentally uncovered people’s tendency to
interpret observed action of simple objects or non-figurative
unitary dots movements displayed on screens as apparent
behaviour. In analogy to the concepts of animacy and
agency illustrated in the Context section 2.3 above, they
reveal that while some movements elicited “factual” or
inanimate descriptions, others explain it more in “social”
or animate terminology apparent in the use of attributions
like motivations, emotions, age, gender and relationships to
objects.
In the tradition of these early empirical works, using
screen based animations, Blythe et al. [24] experimentally
show that a single object’s movement stripped away from
all environmental context, posture and facial information
is enough for people to differentiate motion cues from the
inanimate domain of physical movement (causal) into the
domain of animate intentions and desires such as chasing,
playing and courting. Accordingly, Scholl and Tremoulet [41]
demonstrate that an entities’ simple motion cues like changes
in velocity and direction in absence of any reference back-
ground can produce an impression of animacy. Similarly,
using point-light displays Simion et al. [42, p.43] provide
a perspective from developmental studies indicating that
for several vertebrate species, including humans, the most
obvious feature that distinguishes animate from inanimate
entities is self-propelled motion, as opposed to objects that
require external force in order to move. Their hypothesis
that a primitive bias towards detecting social agents is innate
is supported by an experiment by Mascalzoni et al. [43]
demonstrating that newly-hatched chicks possess an innate
sensitivity allowing them to differentiate and prefer a self-
propelled causal agent (presented by screen/computer-based
animation sequences) as a target for imprinting.
Mori [44] hypothesized that the presence of movement
would affect the relation between human observers and
figurative displays of entities, e.g. puppets, robots, zombies
or humans, and change the shape of his well-known uncanny
valley. MacDorman [45] provides empirical evidence assess-
ing participants’ ratings in terms of parameters determined
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to reassemble the uncanny valley (familiarity, strangeness
and eeriness) towards video clips showing a spectrum of
entities morphing from human to robot (e.g. from Philip K.
Dick to Qrio). However as Zlotowski et al. [46] point out for
the most part the morphed images are not realistic hence
the result being rated as unfamiliar by participants is not
surprising.
Equally to Mori’s hypotheses of the primacy of move-
ment, Vidal [25] identifies movement rather than any specific
detail of the appearance as the main channel for the dialogue
between an entity and humans. This is experimentally
supported by Lehmann et al. [47], having people rating
semantic pairs of traits in regard to a robot interacting with
a human shown on a video screen. Their results illustrate
that movement even if it is not socially engaging behaviour,
facilitates the propensity of humans to ascribe intentions to
agents (robotic objects) as activating the attribution of agency.
Similarly, Hendriks et al. [48] provide evidence that
humans have a strong tendency to be cued by the behaviour
of robots. In an experiment they had participants rating
traits to videos of a vacuum cleaner robot to which five
previously ascertained personality characteristics had been
applied. Their result revealed that the perceived personality
matches with the intended product personality.
Equally this is supported by the work of Bartneck et
al. [49], focusing on embodiment by applying different be-
haviours to physical robots and evaluating participants facial
expressions and hesitation to turn them off. Their results
suggest that for the perception of a robot’s animacy the
behaviour is more important than its embodiment. Likewise
Saerbeck and Bartneck’s [50] findings, assessing participant’s
written responses to different animations applied to two
robots, indicate that the same motion parameters applied
to different robots are interpreted in the same emotional
categories, e.g. all participants used emotional adjectives to
describe the robots behaviour, independent of the difference
in the physical appearance/setup.
Differences in movement characteristics are considered by
Darling et al. [51]. They examined participants affect towards
no movement and lifelike movements of little Hexabug Nano
robot toys. They observed the influence on participants
perceived animacy by measuring the subjects’ hesitation
time striking the robots with a hammer. No significant effect
was found.
The predictability of a movement is a focal point in
the work of Eyssel et al. [52]. They assess differences
in participants’ anthropomorphic interference in terms of
attributions of traits to a short video showing a Flobi robot.
The predictability of the robot’s behaviour and participants’
anticipation for future interaction with the robot (future-HRI)
was modified by providing different descriptions of the robot
(low vs. high predictability/no vs. anticipation of future-HRI)
prior to the trait association task. Their findings indicate that
when social relevance is increased through anticipation of
an interaction, anthropomorphic interferences increase for
predictable and unpredictable behaving robots, while un-
predictable behaviour does not increase anthropomorphism
when there’s no interaction anticipated by the participants.
Furthermore their finding that unpredictability leads to an
increase of attention provides empirical support for the effect
of ambiguity outlined in the Context section 2.5.
3.3 Assessing the interpretative relationship
Conclusively, participants’ interpretations in these studies are
predominantly assessed using traits or features to indicate to
what degree an entity appears to have agency and animacy.
These different degress are evident for example in potential
shifts e.g., human to non-human (anthropomorphism) or
vice versa dehumanizing humans, as a relational mapping
from a source domain to a target domain analogously with
the sociolinguistic device of metaphor [53, p.95]. In equal
measure to the examples and concepts delineated in the
Context section these works empirically disclose on the
one hand the role of movement and on the other the use
of language as an indicator for differences in the affective
relationship as summarized in Figure 1.
The use of words for evaluation is controversial though,
as pointed out by Gelman [54, p.159], in one of Stewart’s
studies [56] subjects responded by choosing between the
attributions of ‘alive creature,’ ‘non-alive object,’ ‘can’t tell’
which in turn were assigned degrees of inanimacy scores of
0, 1, and 2 for use in parametric analyses. However, ‘non-
alive’ is a predicate that has multiple meanings, including
‘dead’ which is a predicate that can be used sensibly with
animate noun phrases. In equal measures, Coeckelberg
and Gunkel [57] indicate the very term “the animal” is
not morally neutral but already makes a decision about
the status of the animal. They refer to Derrida [58, p.41]
denoting it “l’animot” in that respect, to call attention to
the words potential of influencing and priming people’s
appreciation of an entity by applying the property of the
category, e.g., animal. Coeckelberg and Gunkel furthermore
identify the issue of understanding others, e.g., an alien
creature, a sophisticated robot, a socially active computer,
or even another human, is never a simple black/white or
either/or issue rather than a matter of degree.
With this in mind, the framework we established is a
relational approach on two levels. First, we establish a rela-
tionship between subjects and their interpretation of various
entities using various features used to describe movement
and behaviour. Second, participants’ interpretation is not
just a rating of accept the feature as true or false rather than
coming with a scope of attribution ranging from “not at all”
to “very much.”
4 STUDIES
In general the work presented here is about subjective inter-
pretations. In particular, it concerns metaphorical attribution
of features to entities presented with and without movement.
We attempt to assess to what degree an entity appears
to an observer to have features of agency and animacy as
outlined in the previous sections. We use the concept of
metaphors as, in accordance with Duffy [59, p.181] who
disagrees with [60], we think humans do not “mindlessly
apply social rules and expectations to computers” [60, p.81]
that provide an explanation of (a system’s) behaviour such
as people projecting intrinsic intentionality. To our mind,
the observer’s interpretation is not analysable in terms of
any explanatory system of functional or intentional states
of the object. Rather, it can only be interpreted as what
it is like [61], because “nothing is metaphysically hidden.
However ignorant we are of octopuses, aliens, and robots,
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simple movement complex
Qualified by specified, causal, rigid, rotary or translatory
movements, passive continuous transfer of motion from A to B
(launch effect), e.g. [39], [40]
qualities Qualified by spontaneous, active, relative to others, streaky
movements, motion of B not caused by A, discontinuation in
causal rules and structures, e.g. [38], [50]
predictable unpredictable
Characterized by structured, planned and repetitive
movements, the entity (e.g. robot) seems to follow a regular
principle, e.g. [41], [52]
Characterized by contingently spontaneous and streaky
behaviour, the entity’s behaviour seems to follow a sort of
random principle, e.g. [33], [52]
involuntary intentional
Extrinsic motive to act, entity is perceived as having no control,
being the recipient and experiencer of an action, playing a
receptive/mechanical role, e.g. [20], [22]
Intrinsic motive to act, entity is interpreted as being the author
and owner of action, playing an agentive role in an
action/events, e.g. [21], [42]
automatic autonomic
Cause and effect relationship, entities cannot respond with
independent action and seem to act on external situational
forces and conform to physical constraints, e.g. [24], [54]
Responsive to cause and effect, entities seem to resist and
respond to forces and physical constraints acting upon it, able
to violate energy principles, e.g. [37], [55]
physically movement psychologically
Interpretation of events using vocabulary mainly from the
domain of naive physics, as unintentional, mechanical,
automatic or causal, e.g. [23], [37]
descriptions Interpretation of events using psychological vocabulary, entities
are primarily described as intentional, being autonomous or
having reasons, e.g. [4], [36]
factually socially
The event is delineated with instrumental, non-social and
factual features, using an impersonal language describing
entities as fulfilling a function and serving a purpose, e.g. [4],
[39]
The apparent behaviour is described with features of intentional
action and social interaction using personal language
describing living beings, e.g. [29], [38]
examples from














Fig. 1. Agency framework summarizing related works. The deployed topology provides dichotomies as degrees between animate and inanimate
(horizontal) and organized by cognitive complexity from elementary non-figurative movement qualities to complex metaphors used to describe
movement (vertical), to facilitate illustrating shifts in peoples interpretation of an entity’s apparent action in terms of feature attributions comprising
degrees of animacy and agency.
nothing about them is truly hidden from us, that is to say
the other side of a metaphysical veil” [62, p.26].
These interpretations, methodologically grounded in
“folk phenomenology [provide] description of experience
stemming from subjective or first person analysis, which
feels can be exported, with limited modification, to other
experiencers of the same or similar phenomena” [63, p.3
referring to [64]]. In this way, computing subjective responses
to various entities represented with and without movement
results in intersubjective or shared features attributed to
the representation of the entity under the specific condition.
The relation between these shared features are subsequently
calculated, compared and discussed.
To that effect this section reports two empirical studies
based on quantitative methods to measure participants’
relation to entities and potential perceptual shifts elicited
by movement and behaviour.
In the fashion of Gärdenfors’ theory of phenomenal
conceptual spaces [65], aiming at describing the psycho-
logical structure of the perception and memories of humans
and animals, the aim here is twofold. First, determine and
compute observers subjective interpretations of various types
of entities, like humans, animals, and machines. Second,
represent them in a geometrical feature-space. Participants’
responses were represented in geometrical structure, com-
puted using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and vector
displacement. This method establishes a relational approach
with the objective of obtaining a spatial representation. Hence
it facilitates illustration and assessment of differences be-
tween participants’ relationship to entities. This is measured
as distances between interpretations of entities, and through
shifts in similarity and dissimilarity between entities, to make
judgements on how movement affects this relationship.
The methodology presented is informed and validated in
two online studies, gathering subjects’ responses to various
pictures of entities represented with and without movement.
Both studies used pictures and videos of humans, animals
or machines to study if and how movement has an effect on
people’s understanding of living and non-living agents, as
manifest in the concepts of agency and animacy. Study A
provides the process to build and calibrate a feature-space
based on a spatial representation of participants’ interpre-
tations obtained from ratings of different traits or features
in response to images. The result provides a measurement
tool for Study B, using the feature-space as a foundation,
to examine the effect of movement, again using subject’s
responses to a subset of the features.
The research was approved by Queen Mary University
of London’s ethics committee. The participants provided
their informed consent before seeing the presentation and
responding to the questions.
4.1 Study A – Building and calibrating the feature-
space
This study is motivated by the aim to built a feature-space
using empirical data and computing the responses of subjects
collected via an online study. This is carried out by means of
collecting subjects’ interpretations – rating of features on a
Likert scale to image representations from categories of either
humans, animals or machines. The choice of the categories
of machines and humans emanated from work by [32] and
was extended with animals following an email conversation
with Sarah Kiesler. Processing the responses in respect to the
categories results in a feature-space based on empirical data, to
be used as a measurement tool for the follow up study. This
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part requires three steps whose method and procedure we
subsequently describe.
4.1.1 Step I – gather the data
The objective is to gather the data from subjects’ interpreta-
tions, resulting from individual responses relating features to
three different picture-sets representative for the categories
of humans, animals and machines.
Method
To collect the data and build a feature-space, a study was
carried out in an online framework. The data was acquired by
showing each participant randomized one of three different
picture-sets. Each set was based on 20 randomized pictures
from one category of humans, animals or machines. Partici-
pants were asked to interpret a set of 70 features in regard to
their picture set, by rating them on a Likert scale from 0-6.
Distributing the picture-sets of each category equally over
the participants served as a independent variable.
The categories are humans, animals and machines. Each
picture set is a slide show of 20 randomized pictures
representing exclusively that category. With the problematic
terminology of the categories mentioned in the related work
Section 3.3 in mind, an indirect method was deployed.
Instead of using the terminology of the categories – e.g.,
asking “how human-like is this?” – picture sets representative
of a category were displayed to avoid priming.
To group the picture sets of different categories, the
Golden Record was used as a case history and model. The
Golden Record was sent into the universe on-board the
Voyager space probe in 1977, alongside other media, with
a carefully assembled set of images selected with the intent
to communicate our planet to extraterrestrials4. With the
assistance of the United Nations Photo Library, which kindly
gave access to their archive, certain pictures could be replaced
with a more recent version.
The features are based on a set of traits, represented by 70
adjectives characteristic of human and non-human behaviour
– e.g., caring, goal-driven, graceful, spontaneous, structured;
the complete list is provided in Appendix Table 2. Some of
the traits were motivated by Kiesler’s [32] study; these were
extended with items from work by Epley [8] and Waytz [33],
such as: anthropomorphic traits like thoughtful, considerate,
sympathetic; non-anthropomorphic traits or functional fea-
tures like durable, useful, logical; furthermore false fillers
taken from Fussel et al. [66] e.g. wooden or ceramic. We
wished to avoid using items that have differential response
format e.g. machinelike–humanlike or unfriendly–friendly,
so as to not provide differential poles. This can be an issue in
terms of priming as it facilitates identifying the underlying
measuring dimension [67].
Subsequent to the presentation of the picture-set, with the
statement, “To what extent are each of the attributes below
applicable to your general impression of the images you
have seen in the slide-show?”, participants are invited to rate
the features in response to the given picture-set on a Likert
scale from 0-6 with three anchor points: 0 for “Not at all”, 3
for “Undecided” and 6 for “Very Much”.
4. Link to Golden record documentation: http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/
spacecraft/goldenrec.html
Procedure
The participants’ contributions where collected over three
months within a Qualtrics framework, and amounted to a
total of 126 respondents out of which k = 93 completed all
questions. The remaining 33 were excluded as a result of
missing or repetitive answers. From the selected 83, the age
ranged from 18 to over 65, 49% between 35-54 and 40% in the
26-34 range, with 64% male, 31% female, 4% ‘prefer not to say’
and 1% other. With a total of k = 93 participants, individuals
rating of the same set of features in response to images of one
of the categories resulted in three different clusters or regions:
human H (k = 33), animal A (k = 29) and machine M
(k = 31). The framework was set to distribute the categories
evenly over the participants, however, the disparity in these
numbers results from the removal of respondents with not
applicable (NA) values due to their missing out one or more
ratings.
4.1.2 Step II – process the data to obtain the feature-space
The objective for this step is to locate a point for each
participant in a multidimensional space, spanned by the
features, and designate regions representing the categories
of humans, animals and machines.
Method
This is carried out by calculating and geometrically repre-
senting the individuals’ interpretation, resulting from the
rating of the features in respect to the images. From this, a
feature-space with designated regions for humans, animals
and machines is obtained.
The feature-space consists of 70 dimensions, as there are
70 features, based on participant’s ratings of the features
in correspondence to the categories. Applying PCA allows
to geometrically depict the allocation and designation of
particular regions representing the humans, animals and
machines categories in the feature-space.
The regions are determined by the three categories of the
picture-sets: humans, animals and machines. The regions are
allocated using the individuals’ ratings of the features which
correspond to the category of pictures shown to them.
Procedure
For each participant’s rating, a point is allocated in a
multidimensional feature-space with designated regions rep-
resenting the responses to the picture-sets of either humans,
animals and machines. PCA is used to represent individuals’
responses in relation to the images in a geometrical structure
with distinct regions for the categories as illustrated in
Figure 2, here on the basis of the two most significant
components.
In the feature-space, the points are coloured for each
participant according to the category the person has rated
with respect to the corresponding picture-set, resulting in
regions for the categories of human, animal or machine. For
elucidation a “normal probability ellipsoid” with a percentile
of 68% is drawn around the regions for each category.
4.1.3 Step III – optimize the feature-space
This step provides instructions how to optimize the feature-
space in two forms: First, a feature-reduction removes
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Fig. 2. The two principal components of the feature-space resulting
from Study A, showing designated regions with their normal probability
ellipsoids for the categories of humans (magenta), animals (green) and
machines (blue). The brown vectors denote the eigenvectors for the
individual named traits.
features that provide little information, to reduce the total
number of features. Second, the mean-interpretation resulting
from the centroids of each region-cluster is calculated as a
measurement for further examinations of the space.
Method
The outlined method result in a feature-space of a geo-
metrical structure with designated regions and their mean-
interpretations to facilitate judgement of prospective shifts
in the space. Furthermore, transposing the data results in
a reduced feature-set by removing irrelevant features to
optimize the time people spend on the rating.
The feature reduction is carried out using a greedy
stepwise backward elimination method to remove irrelevant
distractors and optimise the feature-space to the most sig-
nificant/relevant features. The aim is to find correlations or
featureless dimensions, e.g., by delineating the convergence
of features like “goal-driven” and “purposeful”.
To achieve this dimensionality reduction the feature-set
is processed with a recursive feature elimination method
provided by the machine learning software Weka [68]. By
feeding the dimensions, the ratings of the 70 features, and the
three categories as classifiers into Weka, a feature selection
through backward elimination can be executed as follows:
Weka’s “greedy stepwise rejection” method [68, p.327] with
a “CFS subset evaluator” [69] selects and removes features
incrementally and concurrently with supervised learning
based on classifiers, which are the categories here.
The mean interpretations are determined by calculating
the centroid of each regions’ cluster. With a sample-rate of k
participants, and specified as mean-interpretation of that par-














































Fig. 3. The reduced feature-space, as a result of Study A, with designated
regions, colored as before, and centroids (circled in black) representing
mean-interpretations.
animals mean-interpretation = Â, machines mean-interpretation =



















To optimize the feature-space first the feature reduction
was carried out, subsequently the mean-interpretation was
calculated.
The feature reduction applied to the data collected in
this study lead to a reduction of the dimensions in the feature-
space to 23. Applying the Greedy stepwise rejection method
described above, starting with 70 features and then throwing
them out one at a time, choosing the worst one at each step,
resulted in a reduced feature-set of Rn, n = 23 representative
features. This result was obtained with Weka Version 3.6.14
using the “CFS subset evaluator” on the full training set with
the default threshold for the greedy stepwise selection5
Mean interpretations are calculated as centroids of each
regions’ data cluster applying Equation 1.
4.1.4 Study A – Result
The results are computed following the three steps above.
Step 1 provides the subjects’ interpretation obtained from the
responses to the images from different categories.
Step 2 processes the responses resulting in a calibrated feature-
space with distinct regions for the categories of humans,
animals and machines as shown in Figure 2.
Step 3 reduces the dimensionality of the feature-space from
70 to 23 features and provides a geometric structure with
the reduced feature-set allocated in the feature-space with
regions and mean-interpretations (Centroids) for the given
categories, as illustrated in Figure 3.
5. For completeness the value of the threshold is
−1.7976931348623157E308
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This calibrated and reduced feature-space allows for the
prediction of participants’ interpretations of entities in terms
of the human, animal and machine regions specified. In this
way the reduced feature-space provides a measurement tool
serving as foundation for Study B.
4.2 Study B – measure effect of movement
This study is using the calibrated and reduced feature-space
resulting from Study A as a measurement instrument to
examine if and how the representation of movement affects
participants’ relations to various entities. By computing
participants’ interpretation of entities in respect to their
spatialization in the feature-space the aim is to provide a
quantitative measure showing differences in participants’
affect towards entities as an effect of movement. The
corresponding three steps are reported in the following
paragraphs.
4.2.1 Step I – gathering the data
Just as in Study A the data is gathered in a Qualtrics online
framework, asking individuals to rate features in response
to images of either static or dynamic entities which is the
independent variable.
Method
The static and dynamic entities are 16 in number. These
are presented to the participant as either a set of eight static
entities, or eight dynamic entities. The static entities are
displayed as still pictures, and the dynamic entities as short
4-5 second video sequence.
The images of the entities are sourced from the authors
video archive or Youtube videos, as the Voyager record
nor the UN photo archive used in the first part provide
moving image material. The 8 entities are represented by
one of the following: of humans, a breakdancer (entity 1)
or a contemporary dancer (2); of animals, an earthworm (3)
or a housefly (4); of machines, a washing machine (5) or a
Roomba vacuum cleaner robot (6); and of natural entities,
clouds (7) or leaves in the wind (8) (see Table 1).
The choice of images primarily originate from chats
during the exhibition of the hairbrush, discussions in the
research group and to some extent from related works. Some
of them where chosen as people reported to find them
attractive (clouds) or repulsive (worm), others in particular
because of peoples account of being surprised and intrigued
by their behaviour e.g. “lively robot”, “dancing washing
machine”, “mechanically marching fly”, “randomness of
leaves”.
The interpretative relationship is constituted in the
same way as in Study A by individuals’ ratings of features.
Here participants are randomly shown four pictures, all of
them either of static or dynamic entities. After each instance,
participants are asked to affiliate the reduced feature-set on
the same Likert scale as in Study A. The online framework
was set for a balanced order of presentation, covering all
possible combinations of the images, to mitigate the potential
of confounding variables within the different entities. As a







The procedure for this online study corresponds to Study
A. Participants were shown images of various entities and
subsequently an interpretative relationship was established
by having participants rate features. However, here the
reduced feature-set of 23 features is used and the indepen-
dent variable is set by entities presented either as static or
dynamic.
The participants amounted to a total of 83 out of which
k = 72 completed all questions. The study was running
for two months with 57% of the participants identifying
themselves as male, 41% as female, and 1% as other. With an
age range of 58% between 35-54 years, 37% between 26-34,
3% between 18-25, and 3% between 55-64 years of age. The
framework was set to equally distribute the instances over
the participants, however respondents with not applicable
(NA) values due to their missing out of one or more ratings
were removed. This resulted in an distribution (k) of the
ratings over the entities as shown in Table 1.
4.2.2 Step II - processing the data
Method
To provide a quantitative measure showing differences
in participants’ affect towards entities e.g., the effect of
movement as a difference in participants’ interpretation to
static and dynamic images, typicality is defined, based on first
calculating mean-interpretations. The typicality comprises
three values resulting from measurement of the entities’
mean-interpretation in relation to the mean-interpretation
of humans, animals and machines. Consequently the effect
of movement is determined by the difference between the
typicality of the static and dynamic interpretations.
The mean interpretations of the static and dynamic
entities are the centroids calculated from the cluster resulting
from participants’ ratings, corresponding to the represen-
tation of the entities as either static (Es) or dynamic (Ed),
hence the mean-interpretations of the entities – Ês and Êd –













The typicality of an entity consists of three values
resulting from measurements of the entity in relation to
the three categories of humans, animals and machines. The
triple values as determined in Equation 3 are calculated by
measuring the distance between the entities Es or Ed in
relation to Ĥ , Â, M̂ .
typicality of Ê =< �Ê− Ĥ�, �Ê− Â�, �Ê− M̂� > (3)
n = number of features
Procedure
The data is projected into the feature-space processing it
correspondingly to Study A by allocating points in the
space for each participants’ responses and colour them
according to whether the person has rated it in respect to
the static or dynamic entity. Subsequently, the respective
mean-interpretation is calculated from Equation 2 and the
typicality in relation to the means of the regions of humans,
animals and machines as given by Equation 3.
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4.2.3 Step III – measure the effect of movement
Method
Differences between entities’ interpretation can be shown
graphically by representing the information within the
feature-space by plotting regions of the projected data
within principal components. However with the distance
measurement of the typicality defined in the above Equa-
tion 3 distances between entities e.g., static and dynamic
can be compared. Hence a quantitative measure to show
effects of movement of an entity, shifts between the static
and dynamic interpretations, can be determined by the
displacement-vector resulting from the subtraction of the
static from the dynamic typicality as stated in Equation 4.
The displacement of the typicality expressed in a trivalent
value of displacement vectors can be used to determine
effects within the entities but also to compare across the
entities.
d(Ês, Êd) = < �Ês − Ĥ�, �Ês − Â�, �Ês − M̂� >
− < �Êd − Ĥ�, �Êd − Â�, �Êd − M̂� >
(4)
Procedure
As a consequence of the entities’ data projected and processed
the effect of movement on the one hand can be illustrated by
plotting the respective static and dynamic interpretation of
the entity as shown in Figure 4. Additionally, the numbers
expressed by the divergence resulting from subtracting the
typicality of the dynamic entity from the static (as stated
in Equation 4) results in a trivalent value of typicality-
displacement in relation to the categories of humans, animals
and machines.
4.2.4 Study B – Results
Results showing differences in participants’ interpretation
of entities as an effect of movement are calculated following
the three steps described above.
Step 1 responses are collected from individuals rating static
or dynamic entities in relation to the reduced feature-set.
Step 2 participants’ ratings of the entities are projected into
the measurement tool, the feature-space. The interpretations
of the static and dynamic entities and mean-interpretations
resulting from Equation 2 are allocated in relation to the
regions for the given categories and a metric of typicality for
the entities is implemented using Equation 3.
Step 3 provides measurements for the effect of movement as
a difference between the static and dynamic interpretation:
Divergence in distance measure resulting from subtracting
the typicality of the dynamic entity (Ed) from the static
(Es) as stated in Equation 4. The consequential displacement
vector (Ês, Êd) returns a quantitative measure enabling a
comparison between differences in participants’ relation to
entities as an effect of movement as for example illustrated
for the Breakdancer in Figure 4.
5 RESULTS
As a result of both parts of the study using the procedure
deployed in the methodology we are able to illustrate differ-
ences in participants’ interpretative relationship affected by
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Fig. 4. Results of Study B, showing shifts in participants’ affect towards
a breakdancer’s (orange) static (pale-dotted) and dynamic (continuous)
mean-interpretations within regions colored as before.
The methodology of computing the subjective responses,
established in both parts of the study, uses the findings
from Study A, the reduced and calibrated feature-space, as
a ‘ruler’ or measuring instrument and allocate therein Study
B’s responses to static and dynamic entities. PCA is used for
understanding the space in terms of individual dimensions
and to visualize the regions. For the typicality resulting from
the distance measures between the centroid vectors, the full
dimensionality of the space is taken into account. With this
approach, depicting different regions representative for dif-
ferent interpretations and concomitant mean-interpretations,
a typicality-displacement can be measured and show changes
in participants’ affect towards movement: Visually by means
of displaying the shift of the regions illustrated by PCA as
well as in numbers concomitant to the geometrical distance
of the mean-interpretations.
The results indicate a shift as for example in the interpre-
tation of a video of a human represented with mechanical
movement, by virtue of breakdancing moves, in comparison
to a static picture towards the region designated to machines.
For this example the shifts in participant’s interpretation
between a static and dynamic entity is illustrated by the
arrow pointing from the static mean-interpretation to the
corresponding dynamic mean-interpretation, as shown in
Figure 4.
The numerical results of the typicality measurements and
concomitant displacement between the static an dynamic en-
tities are listed in Table 1. Shifts in the typicality measurement
are specified by the results of the displacement of typicality,
expressed by d(Ês, Êd) as determined in Equation 4.
6 EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
The developed agency-framework shown in Figure 1 rep-
resents perceptual and conceptual characteristics of an
interpretation of an entity along the ontological categories
of living and non-living. The deployed topology provides
dichotomies to illustrate shifts as degrees of metaphorical
attribution of features to be used in the evaluation. This is
supported by works assessing anthropomorphism as shifts
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TABLE 1
Study results – typicality displacement as a result of computing the difference between the static and dynamic interpretations
Study A
Categories Human Animal Machine Natural Entities
k = 33 29 31
Study B Washing- Roomba-
Entities
Breakdancer Dancer Worm Fly machine robot Clouds Leaves
Es Ed Es Ed Es Ed Es Ed Es Ed Es Ed Es Ed Es Ed




to human -0.97 -0.44 -0.47 0.8 -0.45 -0.85 -0.64 -0.58
to animal -1.53 0.23 0.1 0.75 -0.19 -0.65 -0.36 0.08
to machine 1.3 -0.38 -0.09 -0.22 0.96 0.57 -0.31 -0.21
in ontological commitments from human to non-human,
and correspondingly judgements of agency based on an
interpretation of an entity as animate or inanimate.
Correspondingly, Study A provides the procedure to
obtain a feature-space: based on individual interpretations,
the rating of traits, particular regions for three ontological
categories human, animal and machine, are determined and
allocated in a geometrical structure. For the second study,
Study B, the dimensionality of the feature-space was reduced
and the influence of movement on this classification was
analysed. By having participants’ interpret entities displayed
as either static or dynamic using the same set of features,
the results could be projected into the feature-space. To
express the effect of movement, possible shifts in entities
static and dynamic interpretation, a typicality measurement
was introduced. Calculating the displacement vector between
the mean-interpretation of the static and dynamic entities (the
three distances to the mean-interpretations of the categories),
resulted in a three-part typicality measurement providing
shifts in distances in regard to humans, animals and ma-
chines’ interpretation. It is important to understand that the
use of statistics here is interpretative and not inferential.
In the following, the measurements6of each entity is pre-
sented and discussed. To further emphasise the findings, the
reader’s attention is brought to variations in the attribution
of agency and animacy as depicted in the agency-framework.
Additionally the results are viewed in a different way by
picking driving features in respect to their mean rating as
found in Table 3 (see Appendix). Driving features are features
that contrast substantially in the mean ratings between
the static and dynamic. This subjective analysis, picking
individual features, is used to supplement the findings and
methodology employing the whole feature-space.
Human entities
In the case of the Breakdancer changes in the affective rela-
tionship as typicality-displacement is indicated by the shift
towards the region of machines and away from the animal
and human realms: the typicality becomes fairly negative
(−0.97) in relation to humans; to an almost 50% stronger
degree (−1.53) towards the animal-typicality; and strongly
6. Because of the non-normal data, medians were also calculated. The
results are very similar, therefore the geometrical interpretation on the
basis of means is deployed, which is easy and intuitively to understand.
positive (1.3) in regard to machine-typicality. Throughout the
dataset these displacements are the ones showing the highest
effect. The Dancer’s interpretation in turn shows a flimsier
typicality-displacement away from the regions of humans
(−0.44) and machines (−0.38) and to less than half of those
distances a shift towards animals (0.23).
The typicality-displacement implies the Breakdancer’s
dynamic interpretation is attributed less intentional and more
automatic and involuntary qualities. This is pertinent to the
mechanical movement, which in a poetic way transfigures a
human through it’s movement appearing similar to an au-
tomaton. This shift in the affective relationship is supported
by driving features. For instance the increase of controllable
with the dynamic’s mean rating (dynamic: 0.41, static:−0.35)
converging to machines (0.34). Notation: subsequently we
denote the values in the brackets for static as ’s’ and
for dynamic as ’d’. The static Breakdancer is furthermore
interpreted as less synthetic (s:−0.51) in correspondence with
humans (−0.56) and animals (−0.62), while the dynamic is
almost undecided (d:−0.08) for this feature that is mostly ap-
plicable to machines (0.46). However the contribution of the
individual feature is not always evident in their contribution
to the overall result. As for example the moving Breakdancer
was rated less aggressive (d:−0.64), approximating the mean
for humans (−0.57), while the undecidedness in terms of the
static (−0.02) could be ascribed to the posture in the static
picture showing a person with it’s arm up encompassing
ambiguity whether the subject is involved in a dance or
rumble. Hence looking at the data in this way gives evidence
how individual features contribute more or less but when
we consider all of the individual ratings in our result we end
up with the established methodology.
In essence the results suggest the Breakdancers’ move-
ment is interpreted more as guided by a prescribed algorithm
determining the repetitive machine-like movement pattern as
more predictable and automatic. While the Dancer’s movement,
correspondingly determined by choreography, embodying
intentional as well as involuntary qualities in its behaviour,
leads to an altogether much subtler decrease of human and
machine-typicality. This is indicated by feature ratings of
the dynamic as less synthetic (d:−0.49, s:−0.06) and produc-
tive (d:−0.4, s: 0.04), both for the most part applicable to
machines (synthetic: 0.46, productive: 0.56), but also slightly
less instrumental (d:−0.18, s: 0.13), tending towards animals
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(−0.26) for a feature that is most applicable to machines
(0.49). The shift could be inferred from the dancer’s particular
style, here a five second appearance of Kate Bush. Hence the
subtle decrease of intentional and autonomic qualities away
from human-typicality but also away from machine, together
with the minor approximation to animals could be ascribed
to her distinct dance style which is said to be influenced by
her karate training, giving rise to a behaviour that is less
predictable and more complex.
Both results indicate that predictable movements lead to a
decrease of human inferences which corresponds to findings
of Eyssel et al. [52]. Even though in the case of the Dancer
the effect is less than half the size in comparison to the
Breakdancer’s. Kate Bush’s dance is rhythmic rather than
metronomic, thus being interpreted as more spontaneous
and following a more random principle makes her behaviour
still predictable but to a lesser degree while the repetitive
mechanical movements of the Breakdancer also affects its
interpretation as more machine-like.
Animal entities
Looking at entities within the animal categories, the Worm’s
interpretation demonstrates a drift away (−0.47) from the
regions co-opted by humans and fairly nominal shifts in
relation to machine (−0.09) and animal-typicality (0.1). For
the Fly the numbers indicate the dynamic representation
obtains a strong tendency towards human-typicality (0.8)
and animal-typicality (0.75) and slight decrease in machine-
typicality (−0.22).
The Worm’s displacement could be inferred from ob-
servers impulsive reaction to the Worm’s slimy appearance
similar to spiders and other angst-inducing creatures. This
is indicated by a slight increase of creepiness. In addition the
helplessness expressed in the tossing and turning shown in
the dynamic representation. The apparent inability to find a
way into the ground decreases the autonomy and increases
the automatic qualities in the movement, which is supported
by driving features being rated less applicable to the dynamic
representation like caring (d:−0.59, s:−0.15) or productive
(d:−0.25, s: 0.31) and instrumental (d:−0.57, s:−0.01). The
vain movement dwindles the intentional behaviour to leave
the daylight, hence having only a certain control over the
action diminishes its autonomy.
The interpretation of the Fly’s behaviour was not in line
with the expectations. Due to its discreet movement the
anticipation was the attribution of automatic and predictable
qualities designated by a typicality-displacement towards
the region of machines. However, as the numbers indicate
its interpretation approaches humans and animals. This is
sustained by individual features indicating the dynamic
being interpreted more sensitive (d: 0.18, s:−0.24) and aware
(d: 0.38, s:−0.02), both generally more human and animal
features. Moreover a minor decrease towards machines,
which could be attributed to the rhythmic movement virtu-
ally suggesting a dance pattern, manifest for example in the
dynamic being interpreted more goal driven.
This result, contrary to our expectations, indicates the
second most substantial shift in the affective relationship
of our dataset. The solid interpretation of the Fly towards
humans and animals in contrast to the Worm’s is supported
by insights provided by Kiesler et al. [36]. Their work indicate
that animals like pets who are closer to humans evoke a
higher emotional attachment. Thus the House-Fly’s increase
in human and animal typicality in relation to the Worm’s
could be attributed to it being more familiar that the alien
behaviour of the Worm.
Machine entities
The interpretation of a jiggling Washing-machine shifts
towards machines when presented with movement, as
suggested by the displacement of typicality: Here the dif-
ference between static and dynamic mean-interpretations
becomes negative (−0.19) in respect to animals and more
than double in relation to (−0.45) humans, while strongly
positive (0.96) in relation to machines. Correspondingly,
even though half the effect size of the Washing-machine,
the Roomba-robot’s dynamic interpretation has a stronger
typicality-displacement of 0.57 towards the machine realm
but at the same time an increasing displacement of −0.65
towards animals and −0.85 towards humans.
The result of the typicality-displacement suggests in
both cases the dynamic representation is interpreted as
more automatic and less intentional. However, in the case
of the Washing-machine the displacement is nearly double
towards its machine-typicality while the Roomba decreases
with similar significance in terms of human and animal-
typicality. In case of the Washing-machine this is supported
by the dynamic representation recorded with a higher
rating for goal driven (d: 0.22, s:−0.12), a feature principally
attributed to machines (0.54). Furthermore the dynamic’s
increment for clunky (d: 0.47, s: 0.08), a feature in general
rather undecided for machines (0.08) and not very char-
acteristic of humans (−0.47) and animals (−0.31), which
could be imputed to the machine’s severity of the movement
almost falling apart. Interesting is the shift in the mean
rating in terms of lonely a feature indicating how social
an entity is interpreted. Related Heider and Simmel’s [38]
findings showing that movement is generally interpreted
in rather social terminology, the static is rated quite lonely
(0.54), appropriate to the solitary placement in the backyard
while the dynamic is rated less lonely (0.11), suggesting it is
interpreted more social as an effect of movement.
The Roomba result did not match our expectation. We
expected an inferior attenuation or even increment of inten-
tional agency, as implied for example in the dynamic’s rating
as more aware (d: 0.17, s:−0.33). We anticipated this due to
the robots’ movement: while the Washing-machine stays
put, moving regardless of the situation, the Roomba-robot
does not just move straight forward, it moves in respect
to the carpet in front of it’s trajectory and nestles around
the backpack next to it. Subsequently suggesting its action
is interpreted more autonomic, moving in regard to the
situation, thereto leading to a lesser degree of automatic
movement qualities. However the inapplicability of driving
features like spontaneous (d:−0.21, s:−0.54) reflected in
the negative values and the more logical (d: 0.43, s: 0.06)
and less creepy (d:−0.33, s:−0.65) rating of the dynamic’s
representation indicate the result determining the movement
as less autonomic and intentional.
For both the result could be attributed to a purposeful
and deterministic interpretation of the movement, potentially
expressed in the machines’ rhythmic motion. Similar to the
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human entity’s dancing, the depicted movement in both
cases is quite predictable which is reflected in the increase
of machine-typicality. Additionally both dynamic instances
are interpreted with less human and animal typicality. This
could be understood in terms of humans’ need to interact
effectively as a motivational factor [70]. Thus suggests that
when the conceivable ambiguity of an objects’ movement is
obviously predictable, we get on with it and interpret it as
less autonomic and intentional, for example in the case of the
Washing-machine’s fierceness and the threat of breakdown,
or the Roomba-robot’s potential for spontaneous lively
behaviour.
Natural entities
The natural entities result in the Clouds’ dynamic inter-
pretation with a decrease in machine-typicality (−0.31) in
relation to the static interpretation, almost equal in regard
to animal (−0.36) and with a double effect size (−0.64) in
respect human-typicality. The Leaves’ interpretation also
decreases firmly in human-typicality (−0.58) in its dynamic
interpretation in contrast to its static counterpart similarly
but less significant (−0.21) for the machine-typicality while
the animal-typicality increases marginally (0.08).
The motivation for employing both entities was their
ambiguity: Either are commonly considered as part of the
natural environment, while the cause of their motion could
be attributed to an external force, hence interpreted in a
similar way to inanimate objects characterised by a transfer
from one object to another [39], [54].
The typicality shift of the Clouds represented dynam-
ically could be expounded in terms of the causality and
conformity to physical constraints condensing in a degrade of
animate qualities as reflected in ratings of salient features like
sentient (d:−0.43, s:−0.2), aware (d:−0.5, s:−0.24) and lonely
(d:−0.57, s: −0.09) as less applicable. Similar effect but lesser
for the Leaves, to whose static representation features like
lonely (d:−0.63, s:−0.33) and spiritless (d:−0.61, s:−0.33)
are less attributable. However in contrast, the Leaves are
interpreted more animal and slightly less machinic in the dy-
namic representation. The dynamic Clouds are for instance
rated as less instrumental (d:−0.57, s:−0.31) consequently
less automatic as they not only move in regard to the
environment, their plasticity is affected by the environment.
Likewise the Leaves’s movement is causally effected by the
environment exposing a movement subjugated by the wind
however they stay put which is reflected in the rating as less
creative (d:−0.24, s: 0.25) and complex (d: 0.1, s: 0.39).
7 FINDINGS
7.1 Overview
In a controlled environment, an online study having people
interpret entities represented either static or dynamic, differ-
ences in the affective relationship as an effect of movement
could be shown and measured.
Our results relate to findings from previous works on
two levels: On the one hand using traits to assess people’s
interpretation like the ones mention in the Related Work 3.1
on anthropomorphism, on the other indicating ontological
shifts in the interpretation elicited by movement as in the
agency investigations discussed in 3.2. However, our method-
ology reassembles findings from both and therefore differs
in the following ways: The awareness of the controversial
use of words, as potentially influencing and priming people
made us use an indirect method of displaying images e.g., of
animals instead of using the word animal, as discussed in 3.3.
Furthermore we examine participants’ interpretation of traits
in response to the pictures on a Likert scale from 0-6 rather
than a go/no-go, black/white or either/or level, to facilitate
an relational approach of understanding ‘others’ [57].
7.2 Limitations of the study
We did not measure the cultural background nor the effect of
solitude of our participants. Carey [4, p.33], citing Quine [71],
[72], [73], argues that concepts that articulate common sense
ontological commitments are innate but also a cultural
construction. That an observers’ culture has an effect on the
perception of movement is shown for example by Morris [55].
Additionally loneliness has an effect on anthropomorphism
as shown by Epley [7].
The static images used in Study B are not from the UN
picture fund used in Study A as there are only stills available.
Yet for our measurements we had to have static and dynamic
representations of the same entities. Video sequences longer
than 4-5s would have been preferable, but the Qualtrics
framework at the time of the study did not allow buffering
or embedding of videos in a practicable way. Additionally,
representations of zoomorphic or anthropomorphic robots
(e.g., [47], [49]) have not been tested in the framework.
7.3 Future work
For further studies, we will test the framework presented
in a complex environment e.g., a setup similar to the one
described in the introduction featuring physical objects, or
in a human robot interaction. In addition collaborating with
computer graphic animators to apply screen displays to
measure the effect of the same entity performing different
movements, e.g., comparing an entity’s mechanical with its
biological movement.
8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We reported a quantitative method measuring the relation
between human observers and various human and non-
human entities. Our particular focus was to show that the
affective relationship significantly changes with degrees of
animacy and agency when movement comes into play.
First, we conceptualized an entity’s expressivity ema-
nating from its dynamic form as involuntary movement
or intentional action along with its animacy interpretation
as inanimate or animate. Second, we ground our work in
previous research following similar methodologies asking
people to ascribe traits under different conditions to evaluate
the effect of anthropomorphism. Furthermore, work looking
at movement perception as causal or intentional leading to
different forms of agency attribution. As a key contribution
we provide an agency-framework to illustrate differences in
participants’ interpretation in form of movement qualities
and descriptions, as degrees of agency and animacy.
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Our methodology reassembles findings from both and we
present a metric using an indirect method not asking people
directly about humans, animals and machines but using
images instead of words. Moreover, our method permits
a measurement deploying a relationship rather than just
attributing properties on a simple black/white or either/or
ratio. Additionally, the agency-framework illustrates on the
one hand our metric assessing participants’ interpretation of
entities in analogy to the linguistic device of metaphors, and
on the other our evaluation method by first establishing on-
tological categories for humans, animals and machines, and
second, using the categories to assess changes in the affective
relationship as displacements in ontological commitments
evoked by movement.
Subsequently, our methodology comprised two steps,
both carried out and informed by two online studies. In
the first study we used 70 words to obtain a measure-
ment tool, a feature-space. We asked people to interpret
depictions of entities of humans, animals and machines
by asking them to attribute traits on a scale. As a result
we obtained a measurement tool with particular regions
comprising a distribution of the features typicality along
the three ontological categories of humans, animals, and
machines in a geometrical structures. The feature-space’s
application as a measurement tool is additionally facilitated
by a feature reduction, removing redundant features and
determining the mean-interpretation for each region. As a
consequence the processing and geometrical representation
of the individual interpretations provided a measurement
tool for the second part, Study B, analysing the influence of
movement on this classification by having people interpret
entities displayed either static or dynamic. By using the same
set of traits we could project these results into our previously
obtained feature-space and show changes in participants’
interpretation of various entities as an effect of movement,
for example the interpretation of a breakdancer represented
with movement as less intentional and more mechanical. Or
a lesser degree of anthropomorphism in a Roomba robot’s
dynamic representation.
Along these lines our methodology and studies provide
a quantitative method to assess and illustrate changes in
observers affective relationship to entities based on subjective
responses to different types, and under different conditions,
with and without movement. The processing and geometrical
representation of the individual interpretations in a feature-
space provides a measurement tool that enables one to
look and talk about effects and changes of the conceptions
of entities by means of shifts of typicality, represented
graphically as well as arithmetically by vector distance
measurements, in regard to humans, animals and machines.
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